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  A common-agency lobbying model is developed to help understand why 
North America and the European Union have adopted such different policies towards 
genetically modified food. Our results show that when firms (in this case farmers) 
lobby policy makers to influence standards and consumers and environmentalists care 
about the choice of standard, it is possible that increased competition from abroad can 
lead to strategic incentives to raise standards, not just lower them as shown in earlier 
models. This theoretical proposition is supported by numerical results from a global 
general equilibrium model of GM adoption in America without and with an EU 
moratorium. 
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As of 2002, genetically modified (GM) varieties of maize, soybean and canola 
accounted for one-quarter of the area planted to those crops globally, having been 
close to zero prior to 1996. However, virtually all of those GM food crops are grown 
in just three countries: Argentina, Canada and the United States where, because of 
production cost savings and few regulatory impediments, the GM shares of those 
crops average more than 60 per cent (James 2003). In the European Union, by 
contrast, a moratorium introduced in 1998 has ensured virtually no GM crop varieties 
have been approved for production or sale in its member countries, ostensibly in 
response to strong opposition by some consumer and other community groups 
concerned about their potentially adverse impacts on food safety and the environment. 
That moratorium had an immediate and dramatic impact on trade in these three 
products: in the mid-1990s, the three GM-adopting countries had shares of the EU 
market that were similar to their shares in world trade for those three crops, but by the 
end of the 1990s they had lost market share to GM-free suppliers, particularly Brazil 
for maize and soybean and Australia and Central Europe in the case of canola (Table 
1). 
Why have European and other countries not yet followed the American 
adoption of GM food? The conventional wisdom is that Europeans care more about 
the natural environment and have less trust in their food safety regulators than do 
Americans (see, e.g., Bernauer 2003). Given the hard-line EU stance, other food-




GM crops are grown in or even imported into those food-exporting countries they too 
will be denied access to EU markets. The most important example is China 
(representing almost one fifth of the world’s food economy), which has been 
unwilling to approve GM food production ostensibly because it was denied access to 
the EU market in 1999 for soy sauce that may have been produced using GM 
soybeans from the US. This fear of losing EU market access was also the ostensible 
reason Zambia, Zimbabwe and other poor African countries did not want to accept US 
humanitarian food aid in the form of GM maize in 2002-03. That added to the 
frustration of exporters of GM crops, so much so that in August 2003 the US, Canada 
and Argentina initiated dispute settlement proceedings at the World Trade 
Organization against GM regulations in EU member states. It has also led 
biotechnology corporations to redirect their R&D efforts away from food and more 
towards pharmaceuticals (which have faced almost no opposition by consumers).  
Clearly this is an important issue affecting not only world food trade and aid 
but also, through dampening the investment incentives of agricultural biotech firms, 
the prospect of relieving hunger in developing countries via another green revolution 
(following the one generated by the dwarf wheat and rice varieties released in Asia 
and elsewhere in the 1960s).
1  
 An important first step in resolving this trade dispute is to understand the 
motives of EU policy makers. Certainly consumer and environmental groups have 
influenced policy there, but they have been active in America also. This suggests the 
need to consider producer and national economic interests as well, bearing in mind the 
different production conditions in America and Europe. Two recent insightful papers 
have addressed this issue by looking at the welfare effects of GM adoption for 




Giannakas 2004; Lapan and Moschini 2004). The present paper adopts instead a 
political economy model to take explicit account of the political influence of special-
interest groups, most notably in this case farmers. 
Given that GM products offer potential savings and management flexibility to 
farmers, it is often assumed that without government constraints farmers would adopt 
GM varieties. However, recent research on farmer adoption of these products stresses 
the complex nature of GM adoption decisions and suggests that those farming 
relatively small areas of land prefer to delay or avoid adoption (Fernandez-Cornejo 
and McBride, 2002; Marra, Pardey and Alston 2002). Such farmers, who would gain 
relatively little from adopting GM varieties and yet would face increased competition 
from successful adopters, have an incentive to join with anti-GM groups in 
influencing public policy in ways that limit their exposure to greater competition. 
In developing a model to analyse the political economy of GM food standards 
in trading economies that captures the distinguishing characteristics of the GM policy 
debate, this paper invokes the common-agency lobbying model of Grossman and 
Helpman (1994, 1995). An important implication of the common-agency literature is 
that outcomes are truthful, implying that agents choose the intensity of lobbying (for 
example through political contributions) based on their expected gain from a policy. 
Thus farmers are assumed to lobby for more-permissive or more-stringent regulations 
depending on how it reflects their commercial interests.
2   
Our results suggest that heightened domestic consumer or environmentalist 
opposition to GM crops is not the only reason why there has been a moratorium on 
the production and sale of GM foods in regions like the EU.  Rather, differences in 
comparative advantage in the adoption of GM crops may be sufficient to explain why 




farmers compete in a global market, producers in a country with a comparative 
advantage in GM technology gain a strategic cost advantage by lobbying for lax 
controls on GM production and usage. When faced with a more efficient competitor, 
the optimal response of farmers in countries with a comparative disadvantage in GM 
adoption is to lobby for (or at least not resist) more-stringent GM standards. In this 
way strategic and political factors combine to amplify country-specific differences, 
leading to a greater divergence of policies than would occur in the absence of 
producer lobbying.  
The links between environmental and safety regulations and special interest 
group lobbying have been highlighted in a large and growing literature. For example, 
those examining the strategic use of agricultural product quality standards as trade 
barriers typically focus on the incentives countries face to lower their product 
standards in order to gain access to foreign markets (Bockstael 1984; Bredahl et al. 
1987; Barrett 1994).  Fischer and Serra (2000) extend these analyses to examine the 
strategic use of minimum standard for consumption externalities. In a result that 
differs from the literature that stresses the potential for the “race to the bottom” to 
lead to the adoption of less-restrictive standards, Fischer and Serra show that when 
firms compete in the home country the social planner may raise standards in order to 
maximize social welfare. Our results show that when firms lobby policy makers to 
influence standards and consumers and environmentalists care about the choice of 
standard, it is also possible that increased competition can lead to strategic incentives 
to raise standards. To our knowledge, this has not been previously identified in the 
literature.  
Our model extends the classic models of trade and product differentiation in 




uses a monopolistic competition model of vertical product differentiation and assumes 
that consumers benefit from improved quality (see, for example, Flam and Helpman 
1987; Boom 1995). We instead adopt a strategic trade framework and allow consumer 
preferences for standards to vary. This provides additional insights into the political 
economy of standards decisions by allowing us to investigate the combined effects in 
an open economy on the lobbying incentives of producers of differences in both 
producer benefits from and consumer aversion to GM technologies. We also allow for 
the two possibilities that the new GM technology could either improve or worsen the 
environment. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a model that emphasizes 
the ability of producers to influence government policy decisions through monetary 
contributions. Section 3 highlights important analytical results provided by the model. 
Section 4 summarizes some new computable general equilibrium results that lend 
empirical support to the model’s findings. The paper then concludes with a discussion 
of the more nuanced analysis of the political economy underlying GM regulations, 
and points to ways of extending the analysis. 
 
The Political Economy Model  
 
Consider a two-country world in which (say) a low-cost genetically modified 
maize variety has been developed.  Country i is a maize exporter while country j is a 
maize importer (bearing in mind that maize self-sufficiency is 95 per cent in the EU 
and 125 per cent in the US). Let superscripts denote the origin of production and 
subscripts the destination. Maize export sales from country i to country j are denoted 
i
j X , while 
j






i X  denotes the domestic sales of country i’s maize in its own 
market. Output in each country is produced by means of an input vector (zi, gi) (i, j = 
1, 2; i ≠ j) where gi represents the quantity of GM inputs (such as say maize seed 
sown) and zi denotes all other inputs including non-GM maize seeds.  
On the demand side, consumers have concerns about food containing GMOs. 
Thus in market i, the domestic maize price is given by  (, )
ii i i
ii P Xg γ  where γ
i is a 
parameter representing domestic consumers’ aversion to food containing GMOs. It is 
assumed that the price declines with (i) the quantity supplied, (ii) the level of GM 
inputs used, and the level of consumer aversion to GM inputs. That is, 
/0 ,  / ( ) 0 .
ii i i i
ii i PX P g γ ∂∂ <∂∂ <    
Similarly, the price received by farmers in country i for sales in export market 
j is  (,, , )
i i jj ij j
jjj P XX g g γγ  where γ
j represents consumers’ aversion to GMOs in 
country j.  It is assumed that prices decline with supplies in country j, so 
/0 , /0
ii i j
jj jj PX PX ∂∂< ∂∂< , and that increased GM inputs by producers in country i 
lowers the price that they receive in the export market j, so  / ( ) 0
ij i
j Pg γ ∂∂ < .  
Furthermore, increased GM inputs by producers in country j lowers relative demand 
for j’s maize. Because the two countries’ maizes are substitutes in consumption, this 
in turn leads to a higher demand (and price) for country i’s maize, so 
/( ) 0
ij j
j Pg γ ∂∂ > .   
Analogously, the price received by country j on its (domestic) sales is 
(,, , )
jj i j i j j
jj j P XX g g γγ  where  / 0,  / 0
jj j i
jj jj PX PX ∂∂ < ∂∂ < , / 0,
jj j
j Pg γ ∂∂ <  
/0 .
jj i




Let total production in country i be 
iii
ij XXX =+  and be represented by the 
quasi-concave production function 
i X =  F
i(z
i, g
i), (i=1, 2;  i ≠ j) where 
ˆˆ /0 ,  /0 ,
ii i i Xz Xg ∂∂ > ∂∂ >  
22 ˆ /0 ,
ii Xz ∂∂ <  
22 ˆ /0 ,
i
i Xg ∂∂ <  
2 ˆ /( ) 0
ii i Xz g ∂∂ ∂ > . The 
dual to this production function is the cost function c
i(
i X,  w
i, r
i)  where w
i is the price 
of input z
i and r
i is the price of input g
i.  
The government is assumed to regulate the use of GM inputs in domestic 
production by choosing g
i, the allowable level of the GM input. In situations where 
this regulation binds, the cost function is denoted  (,)
ii i CXgwhere 
i g  is the 
regulated level of the GM input.
3  
The profitability for a country’s farmers of adopting GM technology depends 
on a variety of factors such as the scale of production, factor intensities, climatic 
conditions and farmer education and experience (Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride 
2002). Farm size in particular has been cited as an important determinant of farmer 
willingness to adopt GM technology in the early stages of its diffusion (van Meijl and 
van Tongeren 2002; Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride 2000).
4 That is, country i with a 
relatively large endowment of land per farmer enjoys a comparative advantage in the 
use of GM technology relative to country j. This is captured by modifying the cost 
functions to  (,) ,  (,)
ii i i j j j j CXg CX g θθ  where
ij θθ < .   
  Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), the government in each country is 
assumed to be self-interested and cares about political contributions. Knowing this, 
farmers in each country have an incentive to offer their government political 
contributions (S
i) in return for favorable policies. The payoff to each of the n
i 
producers in country i is defined by 
(, ) (, , , ) (,)
ii i i i ii i j j i j j i i i i i i





i denotes political contributions. Analogously the payoffs to each of the n
j 
producers in country j is 
(,, , ) (,)
jj j i j j j i j j j j j j
jj j j j P XX g g X CXg S γγ θ Π= − −     (1b) 
 
The sequence of GMO policy choices and responses 
 
Consistent with recent events, where the U.S. has led the world in setting GM 
regulations, country i is assumed to be the leader and optimally sets its GM 
regulations first.  Observing these policies, regulations in country j are then optimally 
determined. 
In country i the sequence of events is as follows once the GM technology 
becomes available. First, producers offer political contributions to their government in 
order to influence GM policies. In the second stage, the government determines its 
policy (
i g ) to maximise its own payoff. Finally, producers determine the level of GM 
crop output. Once the GM policy and production level have been set in the leader 
country i, the follower country j determines its GM policy and production level in an 
identical sequential manner. By backward induction we begin by solving the final 
stage of the game in country j. 
 
Output Choice in Country j (Stage 3 in country j) 
Maximising (1b) with respect to 
j
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.                                   (2) 
To determine how output varies with GM regulations, totally differentiate equation 
















 > 0 .                                     (3a) 
Observe that (3a) is always negative since by assumption  /
ji




j X ∂Π ∂  <0.  Thus, an increase in the GM content of 
imports shifts demand to the domestic product and leads to an expansion in domestic 
production in country j.   
Turning next to the effects of an increase in the GM content of domestic 
produce in country j, note that 
2
22
(/ ( / ) )
() 0
/




dX P g C X g
dg X
θ −∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂
=≤ >
∂Π ∂
.                             (3b) 
An increase in the GM content of domestic produce has an ambiguous effect on 
domestic production levels, because of conflicting signs in the numerator (i.e. 
2 /0 ,  ( / ) 0
jj j j j j
jj Pg CX g θ ∂∂ < ∂ ∂ ∂> ).  Intuitively, a higher GM level lowers 
production costs and thus leads to an expansion in output, ceteris paribus. This is 
captured in the term 
2 (/ ) 0
jjj j
j CX g θ ∂∂ ∂ > . On the other hand, consumer aversion to 
higher GM content leads to a decline in demand. When this demand effect outweighs 
(is outweighed by) the cost effect, higher GM use will lead to a contraction 
(expansion) in domestic output. 
 
Government Policy Response in Country j (Stage 2 in country j) 
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume the government is self 
interested and maximises a weighted sum of political contributions and social welfare. 











j is the weight given to social welfare W
j and n
jS
j are political contributions in 
country j.  Social welfare is given by the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surpluses, 
less any perceived environmental change from the use of input g, denoted D(
j g ).  We 
allow for two alternative scenarios.  First, it is possible that increased GM usage may 
result in environmental damage (perhaps through genetic pollution), so that D’ > 0, 
D” > 0. Alternatively, there may be situations where GM adoption confers 
environmental benefits (as would occur through lower pesticide use).  In this case D’ 
< 0, D”< 0. To assess the policy impact of variations in perceived environmental 
change, in the comparative static analysis we consider a simple environmental impact 
function of the form: D
2 ()
jj j g g δ = .  For the case of environmental damage  δ
j > 0 
and for an environmental benefit δ
j < 0.   Thus 
W
j =  ()
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ji i i i i i i i
j j i i ii jj P d X P d XP XP X Λ= + − − ∫∫  is the consumers’ surplus in country j 
and ( )
jj j j j nn S π =Π −  is aggregate producer profit net of political contributions. 
The first-order-condition for the government’s optimal choice of GM regulation in the 












.                                    (4c) 
The interpretation of (4c) is that the government sets policy to balance the 
politically relevant marginal benefits and costs. Since the government values political 
contributions it must trade off the impact of a policy on political contributions against 
the welfare effects of the policy.  The welfare effects of the policy include the 
perceived environmental impacts (whether positive or negative) and the changes in 




lobbyists influence government policies depends critically on the properties of the 
political contribution schedule S
j. Hence, to further characterize the equilibrium 
policy it is necessary to derive the optimum contribution schedule.   
 
Political Contributions in Country j (Stage 1 in country j) 
Each producer determines its political contributions so as to maximise payoffs taking 
account of the impact of its decisions on the government’s optimal response.  
Maximising (1b) with respect to S
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.                                                                                                          (5b) 
Equation (5b) reveals that producers pay contributions to their government up to the 







, equals the marginal 





. This is the local truthfulness condition of 
the common agency model described in detail by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1994). Let S
j* be the solution to (5b). 
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Equation (5c) demonstrates how two opposing factors influence political 
contributions. The first term describes the demand effects of increasing GM content: 
an increase in GM usage lowers consumers’ willingness to pay and thus reduces 
profits. The next term summarizes the usual cost effect: increased use of GM inputs 
lowers costs and hence raises profits. When the demand effect dominates (is 
dominated by) the cost effect, the left had side of (5c) is negative (positive), so that 
lobbying contributions decline (rise) with more permissive GM regulations. The 
intuition is straightforward.  When the demand effect dominates, producers in country 
j have more to gain by supporting stringent GM regulations, and therefore lobby for 
stricter controls; and conversely when the cost effect dominates. 
  Substituting (5b) in (4c) yields the equilibrium policy that is set to maximize a 











.    (5d) 
  Political contributions by producers in country j are not independent of the 
GM standards set in country i (the first mover). On the contrary, if the adverse 
demand effect in country j dominates the favourable cost effect, then a permissive 
GM regulation in country i induces more-intense lobbying for a stringent regulation in 





















 because the denominator is negative by the second-order 





















The intuition for this result is that when the GM content of imports from 
country i rises and there is a sufficiently high level of aversion to GM products in 
country j, domestic producers can capture a greater share of their market by 
differentiating their products from those of the high GM content importers. Lobbying 
for tighter domestic GM regulations therefore intensifies. 
The consequence of this for the government’s equilibrium response to changes 
in the GM content of imports can be determined by totally differentiating equation 
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. This leads to 
 
Proposition 1: If the demand effect in country j dominates the cost effect, then the 
more permissive are GM regulations in country i the more stringent will they be in 
country j.  
 
Equilibrium policies are thus strategic substitutes when there is a sufficiently 
high level of domestic aversion to GM content. The reason is that domestic producers 
lobby more intensively for stricter GM controls when they gain through product 
differentiation, and in a political equilibrium the policies of a self-interested 
government (partly) reflect the preferences of lobbyists through their political 
contributions, as in equation 4c. Hence the government responds by imposing more 
stringent regulations when faced with imports with a higher GM content. Moreover, 
the greater are the gains to domestic producers from stricter domestic regulations, the 




An immediate corollary of this outcome is that when GM aversion in the 
importing country is sufficiently low so that the cost effect dominates, there will be 
standard policy convergence, that is, policies are strategic complements.  
Two conclusions follow from this observation. First, differences in regulatory 
approaches across countries at least partly reflect difference in consumer preferences 
and comparative advantage in GM adoption, in addition perhaps to other motives.  
Second, lobbying in a political market accentuates the degree of policy divergence 
(convergence), compared with the welfare-maximizing outcome that would result 
without any lobbying.   
 
The Political Equilibrium in Country i 
Having characterized the equilibrium policy in the follower, country j, we now 
examine policy determination in country i, the first mover. Maximising (1a) with 
respect to 
i
i X  and 
i
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.                            (6b) 
Equation (6a) defines equilibrium sales in the domestic market, while equation (6b) 
defines the equilibrium level of exports. Note that by equation (6b) the producers in 
country i, the first movers, take account of the anticipated response of country j 






















>0 in equation (6b). 
Turning next to the government’s optimum policy in country i, we assume 
again the government is self-interested and maximizes a weighted sum of political 
contributions and welfare so that 
W
i =  ()





ii i i i
iii i P dX P X Λ= − ∫  is consumers’ surplus in country i and  ( )
ii i i i nn S π =Π −  
is aggregate producer profits net of political contributions and D
2 ()
ii i g g δ =  is 
perceived environmental impacts.  As noted earlier, when the impact is beneficial δ
i < 
0 and when it is harmful δ
i > 0 The first-order condition for the optimal choice of GM 












.                                    (7b) 
Each producer determines political contributions so as to maximise payoffs taking 
account of the impact of its decisions on its government’s optimal response and the 
reaction function of the government in country j. Maximising (1a) with respect to S
j 
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.                               (8c) 
Equation (8c) reveals that three factors influence political contributions in the country 
with a first-mover advantage. The first two terms describe the demand effects of 
increasing GM content, which lead to lower prices and lower profits. The next term 
summarizes the strategic effect. Lobbyists in the first-mover country i will take 
account of the policy reactions of the follower country in formulating their strategy.  
For instance, when the GM aversion effect dominates in the follower country then 







 < 0). Increased GM usage by producers in 
country i thus leads to tighter standards in country j and hence lower export sales for 
country i. Anticipating this response, producers in country i will lobby less intensively 
than they would if policies were strategic complements. The final term in brackets 
defines the usual cost effect: increased use of GM inputs lowers costs and hence raises 
profits. When the cost effect dominates, weaker regulations improve producer profits 
and hence there is lobbying for more permissive GM regulations.   












.                                                                  (9) 
By equation (9) the government policy maximizes a weighted sum of lobbyists profits 
and social welfare. Compared to the social welfare-maximizing equilibrium, policies 
are skewed in favour of the lobbyists’ preferences.  
How do policies vary with the extent of comparative advantage in GM 
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Proposition 2:  The greater the relative cost disadvantage of GM usage in country j, 
the more country i will introduce less-stringent GM regulations so as to capture a 
greater share of the market in country j.   
 
  It follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that producers in country i have to judge 
ex ante whether the adverse demand effects will dominate the cost effects of GM 
technology in country j and, if not, then to lobby more for lax domestic standards the 
greater their cost advantage, relative to country j producers, in adopting GM 
technology. 
Finally, consider the impact of varying the environmental effects of GM adoption in 


















dd g d δδ
=< >  if δ
i < (>) 0.  That is, differences in perceived environmental 
damage/benefits too result in greater divergence of standards, which leads to  
 
Proposition 3:  Environmental benefits (or lower perceived environmental damage) flowing 
from GM adoption in country i will result in less-stringent GM regulations in country i.  
When policies are strategic substitutes, country j responds by introducing more stringent 
standards. 
 
Empirical Support for Lessons from the Model 
 
The above political economy analysis suggests (i) that greater consumer 




may not be the only reasons why GM standards and regulations in the EU are so much 
more stringent than in America; and (ii) that comparative disadvantage (advantage) in 
the use of GM crop technology would result in support by farmers for GM standards 
that are strict in the EU (lax in the US). 
  How plausible are these conclusions? The latter result has empirical support in 
a new study using the GTAP computable general equilibrium model of the global 
economy. Anderson and Jackson (2004) find that, given GM adoption in America, 
farmers in the EU are better off denying themselves access to GM technology in 
return for a ban on imports from GM-adopting countries. Specifically, three of the 
scenarios they present are pertinent to the above analysis: 
•  Sim 1: the US, Canada and Argentina allow the adoption of GM coarse grain 
and oilseeds which results in a 45 per cent take-up for coarse grain and 75 per 
cent for oilseeds (with total factor productivity being higher for GM than non-
GM varieties by 7.5 per cent for coarse grain and 6 per cent for oilseeds), and 
there are no adverse policy responses; 
•  Sim 2: Sim 1 plus the EU and hence all other countries choose to allow 
adoption of these GM crop varieties, which leads to adoption rates equal to 
two-thirds those of the first adopters in Latin America and Australia and equal 
to one-third in the EU and elsewhere (given their less-favorable land use 
environment for cost-effective adoption); and  
•  Sim 3: Sim 1 plus the EU imposes a moratorium that effectively bans imports 
of those two sets of crops (both GM and non-GM varieties) from the three 
GM-adopting countries, and discourages other countries from following the 





A sample of the results from those scenarios are summarized in Table 2. If there is no 
adverse policy response abroad (Sim 1), GM adoption in those three countries raises 
US economic welfare by $939 million per year. But since these three countries 
account for three-fifths of the world’s soybean exports and four-fifths of global maize 
exports, their GM adoption also raises welfare in the EU and the rest of the world 
through an improvement in the latter’s terms of trade, so the global gain from limited 
adoption of that new technology is $2.3 billion per year. US farmers are not among 
the beneficiaries, however, because their widespread GM adoption depresses their 
terms of trade: their real household incomes (taking account also of their off-farm 
earnings) are depressed by an average of 0.18 per cent. Nor are EU farmers among the 
beneficiaries in the EU: even though they do not grow the less-preferred GM 
varieties, the fall in the price of the GM substitute causes the price even of the GM-
free varieties of these crops to fall slightly, and their real household incomes drop by 
0.03 per cent. 
Were the EU to drop its moratorium and allow production and importation of 
GM varieties of these crops, and were all other countries to do likewise, Sim 2 shows 
that US welfare would drop because of the greater competition, but only slightly, and 
the fall in real incomes of US farm households would be 0.3 instead of 0.2 per cent. 
EU aggregate welfare would be greater both because of the lower cost of farm 
production and the improvement in its international terms of trade, but EU farm 
household income would fall more than in Sim 1. 
By contrast, imposing the moratorium as in Sim 3 (which assumes also that 
other countries also refrain from adopting) raises EU farm household incomes so that 
they are 0.8 per cent higher than in the other scenarios. In that simulation, overall 




consuming or producing GM food at more than (3145 + 267 =) $3412 million, which 
is just $9 per capita per year. These results are thus not inconsistent with the 
theoretical proposition developed earlier in the paper that there can be a convergence 
of policy interests between consumer, environmental and farmer groups in the EU 





Both the theory and the simulation results presented above take us some way 
towards understanding why equally affluent societies on opposite sides of the Atlantic 
have adopted polar opposite policy positions on GM food technology. More 
generally, our political economy theory is innovative in showing that when firms 
lobby policy makers to influence standards and consumers care about the choice of 
standard, it is possible that increased competition can lead to strategic incentives to 
raise standards (not just to engage in a ‘race to the bottom’, which has been the thrust 
of much of the earlier literature in this area). 
There are a number of omitted issues that could be added to the analysis. 
Perhaps of greatest significance is the absence of explicit environmental and 
consumer lobby groups. Arguably, this simplification is not unreasonable in the 
context of this model. While environmental lobby groups remain active and have 
maintained a high profile on the issue of GM technology, they typically seek to 
influence policies through publicity campaigns designed to alter public opinion, rather 
than by paying political contributions.  The influence of environmental campaigns, 
while not explicitly modeled, is thus captured implicitly by the aversion parameter γ .
6 




environmental groups together with bilateral and multi-regional trade. The complexity 
of the problem is such that analytical solutions may not be derivable, in which case a 
numerical CGE simulation approach may be necessary.   
This paper has also ignores the important role played by agricultural 
biotechnology firms, who have a clear incentive to promote GM adoption. If they are 
more prevalent, more politically influential, and/or more advanced in the US than in 
the EU, that would be an additional reason for the observed difference in GM 
policies.
7   
Finally, note that while our analysis and discussion has focused on the case of 
consumer aversion to GM products, the results are reversed if instead consumers have 
a preference for GM crops (as potentially could be the case with nutritionally-
enhanced ‘golden’ rice), or if the GM variety is for a crop that has major 
environmental savings, for example in terms of requiring less farm chemicals (as with 
GM cotton) – especially if that crop is not supplying a food staple. The fact that GM 
cotton is increasingly being adopted in a number of developing countries is thus 
understandable. The fact that ‘golden’ rice has yet to be adopted by those same 
developing countries – even though the patent holder is apparently offering free use of 
the technology – may have to do with the fear that their exports of not just rice but 
also other foods would face greater barriers to EU and other markets once their GM-
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Table 1: Sources of the European Union’s non-EU imports of maize, soybean 










          Maize   
United States  64 2  65
Argentina 18 72  13
Brazil 0 11  3
Rest of world  1 6  17
TOTAL 100 100  100
   
         Soybean   
United States  60 42  54
Argentina 9 4  9
Brazil 24 47  27
Rest of world  4 5  10
TOTAL 100 100  100
  
         Canola (rapeseed)   
Canada 54 0  59
Australia 0 22  24
Central Europe  39 70  12
Rest of world  7 8  5
TOTAL 100 100  100
 
 




Table 2: National economic welfare and real farm household income effects of 
GM coarse grain and oilseed adoption by the US, Canada and 
Argentina 
 





Only the US, 
Canada and 
Argentina adopt 











Only the US, 
Canada and 
Argentina 
adopt and the 




   
Change in real farm 
household income (%):   
   
United States  -0.18 -0.29 -0.36 
EU-15  -0.03 -0.08 0.74 
 
   
Change in national 
economic welfare 
(equivalent variation in 
income, US$ million):   
 
United States  939 897 628 
EU-15 267 595 -3145
a 
WORLD 2290 4047 -1243 
 
 
a Not counting any benefit EU consumers derive from knowing that they are not 
consuming imported GM food. 
 
 






                                                 
1 That prospect for boosting economic growth through investment in agricultural 
biotech research was recently rated the second-highest, in terms of benefit-cost ratio, 
of all the prime opportunities to help achieve the United Nations’ Millennium 
Development Goals, according to a panel of distinguished economists including 
several Nobel Laureates. See www.copenhagenconsensus.com 
2 Typically the literature that focuses on firms’ quality differentiation decisions uses 
monopolistic competition models to capture firms’ production (Dixit and Stiglitz 
1977; Riordan 1986). Since our model describes an agricultural industry composed of 
many small, price-taking firms, the firms’ strategic activities include lobbying and 
producing crops. In our model, standards refer to allowable GM content (including 
zero tolerance) and these standards have implications for both producer costs and 
consumer demand. 
3 For notational clarity we suppress other terms in the cost function which are held 
constant throughout the analysis. Thus, z and r are implicitly subsumed in C
i. Note 
also that from the production function  / 0, / 0, / 0
ii i i ii i CX Cg CX g ∂∂ > ∂∂ < ∂∂ ∂ < %% . 
 
4 In fact farm size may be a surrogate for other important factors influencing farmer 
adoption, including wealth, risk preferences and access to credit (Feder, Just and 
Zilberman 1985). 
 
5 These simulations assume the cost-saving to GM farmers is net of the premium paid 
to biotech firms for GM seed, the proceeds of which are ignored in that empirical 




                                                                                                                                            
6 One possible reason why environmental groups seldom lobby through the payment 
of political contribution is that they typically deal with  “particularist” policies where 
the benefits of lobbying for the easing of environmental restrictions are concentrated 
while the (perceived or actual) environmental costs are more widely dispersed across 
the community (Baron 2004).  Hence free-riding and public goods problems may 
make it more difficult for environmental groups to raise sufficient funds to directly 
lobby the government through political contributions. 
7 Both Fulton and Giannakas (2004) and Lapan and Moschini (2004) include biotech 
R&D producers in their economic models. Adding them to our political economy 
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